

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9936

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 12295

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR PFOR MILI GW
SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN SENATOR BYRD AND DEFENSE
MINISTER APEL JULY 5, 1978

1. SENATOR BYRD OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT HE HAD COME AS EMISSARY OF THE PRESIDENT AND ALSO AS MAJORITY LEADER OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE. HE SAID THAT PART OF WHAT HE HAD TO SAY WOULD BE IN THE FIRST CAPACITY AND PART IN THE SECOND. AS REGARDS HIS ROLE AS AN EMISSARY OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO CONVEY AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR NATO AND SPECIFICALLY FOR THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM. NOW THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM IT WAS NECESSARY TO BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THAT PROGRAM. THE UNITED STATES WOULD CARRY OUT ITS PART AND WOULD WATCH FOR RECIPROCITY ON THE PART OF ITS ALLIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT, THE SENATOR STATED, THAT EACH MEMBER OF NATO CARRY OUT ITS PART OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM.

2. THE SENATE WOULD BEGIN CONSIDERING SOON THE DEFENSE BUDGET FOR THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR. SENATOR BYRD BELIEVED THAT SENATE ACTION ON THAT BUDGET WOULD FULLY REFLECT THE US COMMITMENT TO NATO.

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3. SENATOR BYRD ALSO SAID THAT HE WAS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN SEEING AWACS PUT INTO OPERATION. DEFENSE MINISTER APEL INTERJECTED AT THAT POINT THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT BELGIUM WAS NOT LONGER INTERESTED. SENATOR BYRD SAID HE THOUGHT THE BELGIANS WERE STILL INTERESTED. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH THE

PRIME MINISTER AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER OF BELGIUM ABOUT AWACS AND THE HAWK AS WELL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD THEM HOW IMPORTANT IT WOULD BE TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR ACQUISITION OF AWACS AND TO FILL THE GAP IN THE HAWK AIR DEFENSE BELT THAT WOULD OTHERWISE EXIST IF BELGIUM DID NOT TAKE PART IN THAT PROGRAM.

4. SPEAKING AS SENATE MAJORITY LEADER, SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT HE WANTED TO STRESS THAT WITH REGARD TO THE ENERGY BILL THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM WAS BOGGED DOWN IN CONGRESS WAS INCORRECT. HE NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN AROUND FOR A VERY LONG TIME, THAT THERE WERE MANY REGIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PUTTING TOGETHER A NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY, BUT THAT THE PROGRAM WAS DEFINITELY NOT BEING BLOCKED BY CONGRESS. HE STATED THAT THE SENATE IN HIS OPINION HAD MADE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS AND EXPLAINED THE STATUS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION. HE WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT ALL SECTIONS OF THE ENERGY BILL, INCLUDING THAT DEALING WITH TARIFFS ON CRUDE OIL IMPORTS WOULD BE IN THE ENERGY BILL BY THE TIME THE CONGRESS ADJOURNED IN OCTOBER. SENATOR BYRD THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE ECONOMY, FOR THE HELP OF THE DOLLAR, AND FOR NATIONAL SECURITY TO PASS AN ENERGY BILL.

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5. SENATOR BYRD THEN TURNED TO THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON, NOTING THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY FAVORED PRODUCTION OF THE WEAPON BUT THAT IF THE SOVIETS MADE CONCESSIONS ADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY NOT PRODUCING IT, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THAT VERY SERIOUSLY. HE MENTIONED ALSO THAT THE SENATE WOULD REVIEW CAREFULLY THE MODERNIZATION OF THE LANCE AND 8 INCH SHELL WITH A VIEW TO REDUCING TIME REQUIRED TO CONVERT THESE WEAPONS TO AN ENHANCED RADIATION CAPABILITY IF THAT PROVED LATER TO BE NECESSARY.

6. AS REGARDS SALT, SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT A GOOD SALT TREATY WOULD BE OF PRIMORDIAL IMPORTANCE BUT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NO TREATY RATHER THAN TO HAVE A BAD ONE. HE SAID THAT THE SENATE WOULD HAVE THE LAST WORD ON THE SALT II TREATY AND THAT IT WOULD WISH TO SEE THE "FINE PRINT" SPELLED OUT IN THE TREATY. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT HE BELIEVED WE SHOULD

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PROCEED IN SALT II WITH VERY CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH
THE WESTERN ALLIES AND THAT A SALT TREATY SHOULD PROTECT
THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIES AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE
UNITED STATES.

7. SENATOR BYRD NOTED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE
BUILD UP OF WARSAW PACT FORCES AND NOTED IN THIS
CONNECTION THAT SUPPORT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES
FROM EUROPE IN THE CONGRESS HAD ERODED. HE SAID THAT
HE WAS OPPOSED TO ANY SUCH WITHDRAWAL AND HE FELT THAT
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE NO CONCERNS REGARDING
A MANSFIELD AMENDMENT. HE SAID THAT THE CONTINUING
SUPPORT OF THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
FOR BERLIN WAS STRONG AND HE EXPRESSED HIS OWN
PERSONAL WARM FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT FOR THE GERMAN
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED
STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO STAND BEHIND THE SECURITY
OF ITS WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES.

8. RECALLING PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS ON HIS CURRENT
TRIP, SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT SPAIN WOULD
ENTER NATO BUT THAT HE HAD NOT MENTIONED IT IN MADRID
LEST IT BE SEEN AS AMERICAN PRESSURE. AS REGARDS THE
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TURKISH EMBARGO, HE SAID THAT SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS

HAD REPORTED TO HIM THAT ALL NATO MEMBERS EXCEPT GREECE FAVORED LIFTING THE EMBARGO. THE SENATOR BELIEVED THAT LIFTING THE EMBARGO WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE AND HE SAID THAT IN THE SENATE HE THOUGHT SENTIMENT HAD SHIFTED TOWARD SUPPORT FOR LIFTING THE EMBARGO. HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THE SENTIMENT HAD CRYSTALIZED SUFFICIENTLY AS YET TO PREDICT THE MARGIN OF THE VOTE BUT HE THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT THE SENATE WOULD VOTE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO. HE COMMENTED THAT IN THE HOUSE THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT BUT THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS WORKING VERY HARD TO PERSUADE THE HOUSE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO.

9. COMMENTING ON MBFR SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ENCOURAGED BY THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL BUT THAT IT WANTS TO LOOK BENEATH THE SURFACE OF IT, IN PARTICULAR WE WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE DATA ARE CORRECT AND IF NOT COMPATIBLE WITH OUR ESTIMATES WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHY THERE WAS A DIVERGENCY. SENATOR BYRD ALSO SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD NOT FAVOR NATIONAL CEILINGS BUT RATHER SUPPORTED A COLLECTIVE CEILING.

10. SENATOR BYRD MENTIONED THAT HE HAD HEARD OF A DIFFICULTY INVOLVING CONNECTING THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM AT RHEIN MAIN AIR BASE. HE HOPED THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE WORKED OUT WITHOUT TOO HIGH A COST.

11. SENATOR BYRD THEN TURNED TO MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND SAID THAT HE HOPED WOULD THE PRESIDENT WOULD GET A GOOD AGREEMENT ON MULTINATIONAL TRADE BECAUSE THERE WAS A STRONG PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT IN CONFIDENTIAL

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THE UNITED STATES. IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT SECURE AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD REDUCE TARIFFS AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS TO TRADE HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN UPSURGE IN PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.

12. DEFENSE MINISTER APEL RESPONDED TO SENATOR BYRD'S REMARKS BEGINNING WITH A COMMENT THAT THE CABINET HAD MET TODAY TO HOLD A FIRST DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING. THERE WOULD BE A CONTINUATION OF THIS DISCUSSION AT THE FRG CABINET MEETING A WEEK HENCE. HE SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH SENATOR BYRD AS REGARDS MTN BUT THAT THE GERMANS WERE IN A DIFFICULT POSITION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BECAUSE THEY WERE BOUND TO GO ALONG WITH AGREEMENTS WORKED OUT WITH THEIR PARTNERS. HE SAID THAT FRANCE AND THE UK WERE NOT PARTICULARLY

FOND OF FREE TRADE AND THAT THIS MEANT THAT THE FRG WAS LIMITED IN WHAT IT COULD BRING TO THE MTN NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THAT BONN HAD TOLD ITS PARTNERS THAT THE EC MANDATE IN THIS RESPECT WAS NOT YET SUFFICIENT PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS AND STEEL. HE BELIEVED THAT THE THREAT OF AN UPSURGE OF PROTECTIONISM WAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE MONETARY PROBLEM AND THAT ANY EFFORT TO STABILIZE CHANGES IN EXCHANGE RATES WOULD IN THE END BE DEPENDENT ON STABILIZING WORLD TRADE. HE SAID THAT WHEN SENATOR BYRD WENT TO LONDON HE HOPED THAT HE WOULD PRESS THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOR A MORE LIBERAL OFFER IN

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THE MTN BUT THAT IN VIEW OF THE LIKELY OCTOBER ELECTIONS IN THE UK PROBABLY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE NECESSARY MOVES.

13. DEFENSE MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THE REPORT ON ENERGY WHICH SENATOR BYRD HAD GIVEN HIM. HE SAID THAT BONN HAD HEARD THAT THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF GETTING AN ENERGY CONSERVATION POLICY OUT OF CONGRESS BUT THAT SENATOR BYRD'S REPORT WAS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN BONN'S INFORMATION. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT WAS PROBABLE IN THIS FIELD SINCE THEY COULD NOT REFLATE THEIR ECONOMY AND YET NOT BE CERTAIN WHETHER THE AMERICANS WOULD BE ABLE TO PRODUCE AN ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM.

TURNING TO AMBASSADOR STOESEL DEFENSE
MINISTER APEL SAID HE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING MORE
DETAILED INFORMATION ON THIS MATTER BEFORE NEXT
WEDNESDAY'S CABINET MEETING.

14. APEL DESCRIBED THE SOVIET MBFR PROPOSALS AS
AN INTELLIGENT MOVE BY THE SOVIET UNION TO WHICH NATO
WOULD NEED TO GIVE A RESPONSE FAIRLY SOON. HE BELIEVED
THAT COLLECTIVITY IN THE COMMON CEILING WAS ESSENTIAL
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AND THAT NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS WOULD BE
DANGEROUS FOR NATO. DATA WAS STILL A PROBLEM SINCE
THE SOVIETS HAD SIMPLY SLIPPED AWAY FROM THAT ISSUE.
APEL WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE TRYING TO
CREATE PUBLIC OPINION WHICH WOULD FAVOR THEIR
POSITION IN MBFR.

15. AS REGARDS SALT II, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE WAS
NOT TOO MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH SALT II. RATHER, IT WAS
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR SALT III THAT WAS ON HIS MIND.
HE WAS FOCUSING ON THE CRUISE MISSILE AND BACKFIRE
BOMBER AND THE OUTCOME WITH REGARD TO THOSE ISSUES IN
SALT III.

16. MINISTER APEL SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THE NEUTRON
WEAPON EVEN IF PRESIDENT CARTER CHANGED HIS MIND
TOMORROW, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET PUBLIC SUPPORT
IN GERMANY FOR MOVING AHEAD WITH THIS WEAPON. HE SAID
THAT THE FRG HAD BEEN WILLING TO ACCEPT PRODUCTION AND
DEPLOYMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR BUT THAT PUBLIC ATTITUDES
IN GERMANY HAD CHANGED SINCE THAT TIME. HE SAID THAT
HE HAD RECENTLY SEEN AN OPINION POLL WHICH SHOWED THAT
AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE WERE
AGAINST THE NEUTRON BOMB AND SUPPORTED THE POSITION
ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT CARTER LAST SPRING. FOR HIS
PART, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE DID NOT WANT A
DEBATE ON THE NEUTRON BOMB IN THE NEXT MONTHS. IF THERE
WERE NO NEW ELEMENT IN THE EQUATION, SUCH A DEBATE
COULD BE A DISASTROUS EVENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC.

17. AS REGARDS TURKEY, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT IT
WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO LIFT
THE ARMS EMBARGO. HE NOTED THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS
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THE ONLY COUNTRY IN NATO THAT WAS HELPING
TURKEY BY GIVING THEM EQUIPMENT AND OTHER
ASSISTANCE. HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO MOVE
TO EASE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY. HE SAID THAT
HE FELT THAT TURKEY WOULD STICK WITH NATO BUT THAT THEY
WOULD NEED AID AND HE HOPED THAT THE CONGRESS WOULD
AGREE TO LIFT THE EMBARGO BEFORE ITS RECESS THIS YEAR.

18. AS REGARDS NATO, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT SENATOR
BYRD'S REMARKS WERE OF THE HIGHEST INTEREST AND VALUE.
HE THANKED SENATOR BYRD FOR HIS WORDS ON THIS SUBJECT.
HE SAID THAT THE US, UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FRG
WERE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE IN NATO AND THAT FOR ITS
PART THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD DO EVERYTHING
TO STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE. HE NOTED IN THIS
CONNECTION THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS OPPOSED
TO CREATING NEW NATO MACHINERY IN BRUSSELS WHICH WOULD
FORCE GOVERNMENTS TO DO THINGS AGAINST THEIR WILL.
HE SAID THAT BONN WAS ALL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE LTDP BUT
THAT PERSUASION WAS WHAT WAS NEEDED RATHER THAN NEW
NATO MACHINERY. HE AGREED FULLY THAT ADDITIONAL
STRENGTH WAS NEEDED IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD.

19. AS REGARDS AWACS, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE HAD
READ IN THE PRESS THAT THE BELGIANS HAS DECIDED NOT TO

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ACQUIRE AWACS AND IF SO THIS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS FOR

BONN. HE DID NOT LIKE ANY COUNTRY IN EUROPE SAYING NO TO AWACS SINCE THE BUNDESTAG ITSELF WAS NOT ALTOGETHER HAPPY ABOUT THE PROGRAM WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SHIFTING RESOURCES IN ORDER TO FUND THE PROGRAM. HE NOTED THAT THE OPPOSITION PARTY WAS TELLING HIM THAT AWACS SHOULD NOT BE BOUGHT UNLESS THE US DID VARIOUS THINGS TO COMPENSATE BONN. HE FELT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD COME INTO THE PROGRAM IN SOME LIMITED WAY BUT THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE PRESSED RIGHT NOW. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD FALL IN LINE LATER.

20. AS REGARD THE TELEPHONE ISSUE, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A RIDICULOUS QUESTION BUT THAT IT WAS RIDICULOUS ON BOTH SIDES. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE GERMAN POSTAL MINISTRY SHOULD TRY TO DICTATE TO THE AMERICANS AND HE BELIEVED HIS CABINET COLLEAGUES UNDERSTOOD THAT VIEW. ON THE OTHER HAND THE AMERICANS SEEM TO WANT TO GIVE THE GERMANS OFFERS WHICH COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. APEL FELT THAT THE US COULD BUY GERMAN EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. HE SAID THAT HE HAS ASKED STATE SECRETARY SCHNELL TO TAKE THIS UP WITH ARMY UNDER SECRETARY LABERGE AND TO CONFIDENTIAL

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TELL HIM EXACTLY WHAT THE POSITIONS WERE OF THE TWO SIDES AND WHAT THE DIVERGENCIES WERE. HE NOTED THAT THERE WAS A POLITICAL LINK BETWEEN THE TELEPHONE ISSUE AND AWACS AND THAT HE WANTED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD.

21. MINISTER APEL SAID THAT AN INFLUENTIAL OPPOSITION FIGURE HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN THAT THE US SHOULD LEASE THE GEPARD. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS NOT A SERIOUS MATTER. HE DID NOT SEE WHAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC COULD DO WITH THE GEPARD AT THE END OF THE AMERICAN LEASE AND THAT THIS WAS NOT UP FOR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED.

22. MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE LTDP AND THE AWACS PROGRAM WERE BOTH ON A GOOD STREET. IF THE US AND THE FRG COULD AGREE BILATERALLY HE THOUGHT THINGS WOULD RUN SMOOTHLY. HE THOUGHT THAT BELGIUM COULD AND SHOULD BUY INTO THE AWACS PROGRAM, HOWEVER.

23. HE ADDED THAT AS REGARDS THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING IT MUST BE A SUCCESS. HE FELT THAT NEITHER CARTER NOR SCHMIDT COULD COME BACK FROM THE SUMMIT WITHOUT SOMETHING IN HAND.

24. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT HE ALSO WANTED TO RAISE ONE FURTHER MATTER. HE NOTED THAT IN NATO HE HAD LEARNED THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SEEMED TO WISH TO NARROW THE FOCUS OF NATO CONSULTATIONS. HE SAID THAT

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HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A MATTER OF PERSONALITIES OR FRENCH NATIONAL POLICY, BUT THAT HE FELT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT COULD GIVE THIS MATTER SOME ATTENTION. MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE THOUGHT PRESIDENT GISCARD AND HIS ASSOCIATES UNDERSTOOD THAT FRANCE NEEDED NATO AND THEY NEEDED EUROPEAN UNITY.

THE ALLIES WOULD NEED ALL THEIR SKILLS TO PERSUADE FRANCE THAT IT SHOULD BE CLOSE TO NATO. HE

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AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT WE COULD NOT ALLOW A FRENCH VETO OVER CONSULTATIONS IN NATO.

25. RESPONDING TO AN INVITATION FROM SENATOR BYRD TO

LUNCH WITH HIM AND SOME OF HIS CONGRESSIONAL COLLEAGUES WHEN NEXT IN WASHINGTON, MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE WAS HONORED BY THE INVITATION AND THAT HE FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE GERMAN CABINET SHOULD TALK MORE WITH US PARLIAMENTARIANS. GERMAN CABINET MEMBERS WERE, OF COURSE, THEMSELVES PARLIAMENTARIANS AND CLOSE CONTACTS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THEM.

26. MINISTER APEL ADDED THAT WITH REGARD TO SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO HE HAD JUST TALKED TO A SPANISH PARLIAMENTARIAN AND THAT HE WOULD MEET HIS SPANISH COLLEAGUE IN SEPTEMBER. MINISTER APEL SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE SPANISH POINT OF VIEW WHICH WAS THAT SPAIN HAD ENDURED A DICTATORSHIP FOR A LONG TIME AND THAT IT NEEDED A CONSENSUS AMONG ALL THE POLITICAL GROUPS. THEREFORE, IT WAS PROBABLY BETTER NOT TO DISCUSS THE NATO ISSUE WHILE THIS WAS STILL CONTENTIOUS AMONG THE POLITICAL GROUPS LEST THIS BREAK UP A DEMOCRATIC COALITION. APEL SAID THAT HIS CONFIDENTIAL

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PARTY PEOPLE THOUGHT THAT IN ONE OR TWO YEARS THE SPANISH WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO ENTER NATO. APEL REPEATED THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR SOLIDARITY AMONG THE DEMOCRATS IN SPAIN AND AS LONG AS SPAIN IS LINKED WITH THE WEST IN VARIOUS WAYS HE THOUGHT THAT EVERYTHING WOULD BE ALL RIGHT. STOESEL

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